Original published on Global Investigations Review
1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to equip practitioners with sufficient knowledge and understanding of Interpol to enable them to assist clients subject to or at risk of an Interpol Notice or Diffusion.
The chapter considers the powers and practices of Interpol, and the methods by which a Notice or Diffusion can be challenged. It is primarily concerned with Red Notices and Red Diffusions.
This chapter also considers some of the criticisms that have been levelled at Interpol and the organisation’s response to them.
2 What is Interpol?
Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) is the world’s largest inter-governmental policing organisation. Established in 1923, it aims principally to connect police forces across the globe, and to facilitate closer cross-border cooperation and the sharing of information.
Interpol is organised as follows:
- The General Secretariat:[1] The General Secretariat is the organisation’s executive branch. It runs Interpol’s daily operations and is responsible for the transmission of information to and from member country. The General Secretariat is headed by a secretary general, whose role is akin to that of a chief executive. The current secretary general is Valdecy Urquiza of Brazil.
- The General Assembly:[2] The General Assembly is the organisation’s governing body. It meets annually to approve decisions on policy and finances. Each member country has one vote. The General Assembly elects the secretary general, members of the Commission for the Control of Files and the Executive Committee. The General Assembly is headed by a president, whose role is akin to that of a chair. The current president is Major General Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi of the United Arab Emirates.
- The Executive Committee:[3] The Executive Committee is a subcommittee of the General Assembly. It meets three times a year to support the work of the General Assembly, to supervise the execution of its decisions and to provide further scrutiny of the General Secretariat.
- The Commission for the Control of Files (CCF):[4] The CCF is the part of Interpol that considers requests for access to, and correction or deletion of, data. Interpol describes the CCF as an independent body. It can be understood as independent in that it is separate from the General Secretariat.
Interpol is a supranational organisation. Although it is physically headquartered in Lyon, France, it operates almost entirely outside French law, or the law of any other jurisdiction. It benefits from broad diplomatic protection, including immunity from legal proceedings. In practical terms, this means that individuals cannot make Interpol a party to litigation or challenge its decisions directly in court.
Although it describes itself as a policing agency, Interpol is not a police force in its own right. Instead, its function is to share information between police forces and to issue alerts and notices, such as Red Notices.
Interpol currently has 196 member countries. Each has a national central bureau (NCB), which is typically a division of the national police force. The NCBs’ role is to exchange information with Interpol and other NCBs, as well as with domestic agencies, such as local police forces. NCBs often have Interpol as part of their name despite being independent of the organisation; for example, the United Kingdom’s NCB is Interpol Manchester, although it is part of the National Crime Agency (NCA).
Interpol is best known for its Notice system, and specifically the Red Notice system. A Notice is an alert or request for cooperation issued by Interpol itself to NCBs in member countries.[5] Interpol also facilitates the Diffusion system, by which NCBs can transmit alerts (known as Diffusions) and requests directly to some or all member countries. Notices and Diffusions must equally comply with Interpol’s constitution and governing law but only Red Notices are routinely checked for compliance prior to issue. In all other material respects, Diffusions operate in the same way as Notices.
3 What is an Interpol Red Notice?
An Interpol Red Notice is often – incorrectly – thought of as an arrest warrant in its own right. In fact, it is a request to all NCBs to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender or similar action.
Although the majority of Notices issued are Red Notices, Interpol operates a system of other coloured Notices, including:
- Blue Notice: to collect information about a person’s identity, location or activities in relation to a criminal investigation;
- Yellow Notice: to help locate missing persons, or to identify persons who cannot identify themselves;
- Green Notice: to warn about a person’s criminal activities, where the person is considered a possible threat to public safety;
- Purple Notice: to warn about methods used by offenders or to request information about offences; and
- Interpol – United Nations Security Council Special Notice: issued for entities and individuals who are the targets of UN Security Council Sanctions Committees.
Diffusions also follow the colour system; for example, a Red Diffusion is a request transmitted directly by an NCB, requesting some or all NCBs to locate and provisionally arrest a person.
4 Effect of a Red Notice
The effect of a Red Notice varies depending on which jurisdiction is dealing with the case. It can also vary according to the requesting country.
Although a Red Notice (or Red Diffusion) is not a formal arrest warrant (or an extradition request in itself), many jurisdictions treat it as an invitation to arrest and detain an individual, at least under certain circumstances.
In the United Kingdom, under the Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Act 2020, a Red Notice (or Red Diffusion) issued by a trusted country[6] can form the basis for arresting a person without a domestic warrant. This is subject to some procedural safeguards, namely that the NCA certifies the request as meeting minimum quality standards.
US authorities have sought to use Red Notices as evidence that asylum seekers are ineligible for refugee status on the grounds that they have committed a serious non-political crime. However, this practice has recently been successfully challenged in the federal courts.[7]
There are many reported cases of persons being detained on Red Notices. Even after a Red Notice is successfully challenged, the damage can endure; for example, Yidiresi Aishan, a Uyghur web designer and activist, was arrested at Casablanca Airport in Morocco in July 2021 pursuant to a Chinese Red Notice. He had been in transit from Turkey to western Europe. A formal extradition request from the Chinese state followed. The Red Notice was (unusually) swiftly deleted after an outcry from human rights organisations; however, it had arguably served its purpose as it enabled Mr Aishan’s detention and arrest in Morocco, where his extradition has been ordered. On 20 December 2021, the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) issued interim measures, requesting that Morocco not extradite Mr Aishan to China pending a full consideration of his case by the Committee. At the time of writing, it is understood that Mr Aishan remains in custody in Morocco, still at risk of extradition to China.[8]
Even where an individual is not arrested, the mere fact that they are subject to a Red Notice or Red Diffusion can have serious and wide-ranging implications. It can impair the ability to travel freely, it can restrict access to financial services and it can cause huge reputational damage.
As illustrated by the case of Yidiresi Aishan, the Red Notice system is capable of serious abuse and many states either actively use their NCB, or allow it to be used, as a method of harassing and intimidating individuals whom they have no intention of extraditing, and of targeting those who are either opposed to the regime or are business rivals of powerful individuals. In written evidence to the UK House of Commons’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee in 2020, Fair Trials International stated:
Red Notices, and other types of alerts circulated through INTERPOL’s systems serve an important purpose, but they are sometimes misused as a way of exporting persecution and human rights abuses. In particular, they have been used to harass and intimidate political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders, and to put them in serious danger.[9]
The case of Nikita Kulachenkov, an anti-corruption campaigner and colleague of the late Alexei Navalny, further illustrates the point. Mr Kulachenkov was recognised as a refugee by Lithuania. His extradition was sought by Russia for the alleged theft of a poster left in the street and valued at around US$2. Mr Kulachenkov was arrested and detained in Cyprus on a Russian Diffusion. He was detained for three weeks before extradition was refused and he was released.[10]
5 Interpol in the United Kingdom
As described above, a person may be arrested without a warrant in the United Kingdom pursuant to a Red Notice or Red Diffusion issued by a trusted country.
Following the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, Interpol’s systems are now used to transmit extradition requests and other law enforcement data between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
6 Interpol’s governing law
As noted above, Interpol is a self-governing organisation, operating almost entirely outside domestic law. Interpol is instead governed by its Constitution[11] and the texts that derive from it.
This section sets out the key areas of Interpol’s governing law and the checks that they place on its powers. However, clients should be advised that all references to Interpol’s governing law should be understood in the context of an organisation that is largely accountable only to itself.
6.1 Constitution
Article 2 of the Interpol Constitution sets out its aims, as follows:
- To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”;
- To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.
The reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a useful tool for the practitioner: if a Notice or Diffusion is contrary to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it follows that it is contrary to the Constitution.
Article 3 operates as a further check on Interpol’s powers. It provides:
It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.
In practice, a common ground of challenge to a Notice or Diffusion is that it is contrary to Article 3; for example, in 2020, Interpol deleted a Red Notice obtained by the United States in respect of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner mercenary group, and his company, Concord Management Group LLC. Mr Prigozhin and his company were charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States in respect of alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election. Mr Prigozhin and the company successfully challenged the Red Notice on the grounds that it had a ‘predominantly political dimension’ and was thus contrary to Article 3 of the Constitution.[12] The deletion was ordered by the CCF in accordance with its governing law and procedure, which are set out later in this chapter.
Other key instruments of interest to practitioners include:
- Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD);[13]
- Statute of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files;[14] and
- Resolutions of the General Assembly.[15]
6.2 Rules on the Processing of Data
The RPD came into force in 2012. The most recent version was issued in 2024.[16] Notices and Diffusions must comply with Interpol’s RPD, which set out minimum standards for the publication of a Notice or Diffusion.
In respect of a Red Notice, Article 83 of the RPD sets out the minimum standards for publication:
- The offence must be a serious ordinary law crime and not, for example, a private or family dispute.
- If the person is sought for prosecution, the conduct must be punishable by a maximum prison sentence of at least two years. If the person is required to serve a sentence of imprisonment, the sentence must be at least six months or there must be at least six months left of any sentence to serve (or both).
- Sufficient particulars of the requested person’s identity must be provided.
- Sufficient particulars of the nature of the request, including a summary of the facts, the charges, the relevant law, the maximum penalty, and reference to a valid arrest warrant or judicial decision in the member country must also be provided.
As per Article 97(2) of the RPD, the conditions in Article 83 apply equally to sending a Red Diffusion.
Article 86 of the RPD requires requests for Red Notices to be legally reviewed by the General Secretariat prior to publication.[17] In particular, the request must be examined for compliance with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Since 2016, this review has been conducted by a specialist Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF), made up of lawyers and law enforcement specialists. Since 2018, the NDTF has also been tasked with reviewing pre-existing Red Notices and Diffusions.
In practice, the NDTF rarely refuses a request: in 2023, 1.2 per cent of Red Notices and Diffusions were refused or cancelled because of non-compliance with Article 2 or 3 of Interpol’s Constitution.[18]
Article 99 of the RPD requires an NCB circulating a Diffusion to ensure that the request is compliant with the Constitution and with international law.
6.3 Statute of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files
The Statute of the CCF defines the role of the CCF, including its composition and powers. Articles 29 to 42 of the Statute set out the procedure by which the CCF will consider requests and the timescale for considering an application (see ‘Application to the CCF’, below, for more detail).
6.4 Resolutions of the General Assembly
The legal status of a Resolution is not defined in the Constitution. For present purposes, they are best understood as statements of policy and aids to interpretation for the General Secretariat and the CCF.
Resolution AGN/20/RES/11 of 1951[19] established the ‘predominance test’ and is of relevance to Article 3 of the Constitution:
no request for information, notice of persons wanted and, above all, no request for provisional arrest for offences of a predominantly political, racial or religious character, is ever sent to the International Bureau or to the National Central Bureaus, even if – in the requesting country – the facts amount to an offence against the ordinary law.
The 1951 Resolution predates the current Constitution and Article 3, but the predominance test endures.
Resolution GA/1984/53/RES/7 of 1984[20] gives further guidance on political acts and acts done by politicians in connection with their political activities. It also purports to exclude terrorism from the scope of Article 3.
Resolution GA/1984/53/RES/7 of 1984 makes clear that a request and the surrounding circumstances must be carefully examined in order to determine its character. It is not sufficient to state that a request is compliant with Article 3 simply because it concerns an ordinary law crime, or conversely to state that it is not compliant because there may be a political element to it. The status of the requested person is relevant (e.g., if they are a current or former politician or a political activist) but so is the nature of the conduct alleged.
Other Resolutions of interest include GA/2017/86/RES/09,[21] which concerns Interpol’s policy towards refugees. In short, it calls on member countries not to allow criminals and terrorists to ‘abuse the refugee protection regime’. Clearly there is a balance that needs to be struck between respect for the international system of refugee protection and recognising that some seek to abuse it; however, the wording of the resolution suggests that Interpol, as an organisation representing global policing, may be more concerned with the risk of abuse rather than a client’s well-founded fear of persecution.
7 Guidance for practitioners
Practitioners seeking to challenge a Notice or Diffusion will need to have careful regard to the governing law described above. They can also find guidance in the repository of practice and the decision excerpts published by the CCF (see further, below).
7.1 Repository of practice
In November 2024, the General Secretariat published a repository of practice on Articles 2(1) and 3. This expands on the 2013 repository of practice on Article 3. It sets out the background and principles underpinning Articles 2(1) and 3 and provides examples of how they have been interpreted by the General Secretariat in a range of scenarios, including offences committed by current and former politicians, offences concerning freedom of expression and offences with religious or racial elements.
Practitioners will find it helpful to examine the repository of practice to identify similarities between their cases and those where the General Secretariat has refused to process data. Although the repository of practice concerns how the General Secretariat approaches its decision-making, it is plainly relevant to how the CCF evaluates requests for deletion.
7.2 Decision excerpts
The CCF publishes decision excerpts[22] from selected cases. These are anonymised decisions covering a range of challenges to data processing. Because they are anonymised versions of full decisions rather than snapshots or scenarios, decision excerpts give a more detailed flavour of the decision-making process than the repository of practice. However, there is no explanation as to how a particular case is selected and the database is rarely updated. The CCF has recently published decision excerpts from 2024 but no excerpts have been published for 2020–2022.
The decision excerpts do not reveal the identity of the requesting state. Assertions made by the requesting state largely seem to be taken at face value. No consideration appears to be given to whether the state in question is a serial offender in terms of abusive requests.
In the authors’ view, there is no good explanation for the CCF’s failure to name requesting states, except in cases where knowing the identity of the requesting state would also reveal the identity of the requested person.
Decision excerpts can be instructive, however, as they show how the CCF analyses a request for deletion, including how it engages with issues beyond those covered in the repository of practice, such as a requesting state’s failure to seek extradition, or a court’s refusal to extradite. Decision excerpts cover a wider range of Article 2 matters than those captured by the repository of practice, such as where it is argued that the request is not compliant with Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (prohibition on torture and degrading treatment) or Article 25 of the UDHR (right to security in sickness).
From time to time, decisions are leaked; for example, the decision to delete the United States’ request in respect of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin was widely circulated online. Although leaked decisions cannot always be verified, they also provide some useful insights.
8 Challenging a Red Notice or Red Diffusion
Given Interpol’s legal status, it is not possible directly to challenge a Notice or Diffusion in domestic or international courts. The available options are:
- an internal challenge, by making an application to the CCF; or
- a collateral challenge, in domestic or international courts.
8.1 Challenge by application to the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files
As described above, the CCF is the part of Interpol that considers requests for access to, and correction or deletion of, data. It is also possible to make pre-emptive requests: if a client has reason to believe that an application for a Red Notice is likely to be forthcoming, it can be advantageous to contact the CCF in advance, explaining why any such request would be inadmissible.
According to the CCF’s 2022 annual report,[23] of the 470 admissible complaints closed by the CCF, only 124 were found to be compliant with Interpol’s rules. For all the CCF’s faults, it is remarkable that more than 70 per cent of the Red Notices and Diffusions challenged do not stand up to its scrutiny.
The process for making an application is set out on Interpol’s website,[24] where links to the relevant forms and procedural guidance are also available. Applications are made in writing and are considered on the papers. It is theoretically possible for a request to be considered at a live hearing but this is at the sole discretion of the CCF. The authors are unaware of any oral hearings having actually been conducted by the CCF.
Similar to a court considering an extradition request, the CCF is generally unconcerned with the strength of the evidence or the merits of a case, though these may be relevant to whether the request has been made in good faith or for some collateral purpose. A strong application will refer the CCF to Interpol’s internal law and to objective evidence that supports the client’s case for deletion. Depending on the nature of the case, this might include decisions of domestic or international courts, medical evidence, news reports or reports of international bodies, such as human rights groups.
The CCF consults requesting countries on applications for correction or deletion. Clients should be advised that any information provided in an application is liable to be shared with the requesting country unless it is specifically requested that the information is withheld. Aside from the risk that information is shared with a requesting country contrary to an applicant’s instructions, the risk with providing information but requesting that it is withheld is that the CCF considers the member country has not had a fair opportunity to respond to the challenge and is more sympathetic to its position.
Once an application has been declared as admissible, it will be considered by the CCF at a session. The CCF is required by its Statute to meet at least three times a year. Decisions are made by a panel comprised of nationals of Interpol member countries. The CCF’s operating rules provide that members may not sit on a case in which they have an interest, are a national of the country whose request is being challenged or are otherwise in a position where their independence may be called into question. However, there is no way to monitor or challenge a decision for perceived or actual bias. There is no published register of members’ interests.
The timescale for an application is set out in the Statute of the CCF. A decision on the admissibility of a request should be made and communicated within a month of receipt. A request for correction or deletion of data should be made within nine months of it being declared admissible. The decision must then be communicated to the General Secretariat, which implements the decision. The CCF will then notify the applicant that a decision has been implemented. Typically, a request for deletion will take around 12 months. There is no formal mechanism by which a decision can be expedited, nor is there any way to challenge the length of time a decision is taking.
One particular difficulty that can arise in challenging a Red Notice or Diffusion is that NCBs have the power under Article 35 of the Statute of the CCF to request that information is restricted (i.e., shared with the CCF but not with the data subject). There is no procedure for challenging a decision to restrict information. The CCF recognises that the use of restrictions by NCBs is a growing issue and presents an equality of arms challenge for the data subject, but it does not appear to have any power to address the issue.
There is no right of appeal against a decision of the CCF but it is possible to make an application for revision based on new information. Any such application will need to be made within six months of the new information arising. It should address the test in Article 42 of the Statute of the CCF, namely how the new information could have led to the request being decided differently.
8.2 Collateral challenges
An external or collateral challenge will not result in the deletion of a Red Notice or Red Diffusion but it may restrict its application within the jurisdiction where the challenge is brought. It may also undermine the credibility of the Red Notice or Red Diffusion in countries with similar legal systems. Practitioners will need to be creative. Some examples of collateral challenges include using data protection law and, in the European Union, freedom of movement.
8.2.1 Domestic data protection law
As Interpol data is held and circulated by domestic agencies, it is possible to challenge the lawfulness of the data processing by reference to domestic law; for example, in the United Kingdom, the Data Protection Act 2018 regulates the sharing of law enforcement data. The UK data controller (the NCA) can be challenged on a lawful basis for the sharing of data. This is a helpful approach where data provided by Interpol is demonstrably wrong or where the controller continues to process data even after Interpol has deleted it.
The above approach can apply both to the sharing of data within the United Kingdom and its transmission outside the United Kingdom. As cooperation with Interpol will often require the NCA to transmit data to Interpol itself or to states outside the European Union, the question will arise of whether the conditions for the lawful sharing of data, as set out in section 73 of the Data Protection Act 2013, are met.
8.2.2 Freedom of movement
In the case of WS v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,[25] the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that where a court in a Schengen Member State had made a determination of double jeopardy, other Member States were bound by it and persons could not have their freedom of movement restricted by a Red Notice that offended the double jeopardy principle.
The case concerned a former manager of a large German company. He was under criminal investigation in relation to bribery allegations through his company in Argentina. In 2009, the Public Prosecution Office of Munich agreed to accept the payment of a fine in relation to the investigation and closed the case. However, the United States also investigated the same conduct and issued a Red Notice. The German authorities informed Interpol that the proceedings had been closed, explaining that further prosecution would violate the principle of double jeopardy – but a deletion could only be carried out by the United States. The former manager could therefore not leave Germany as he risked arrest, pursuant to the Red Notice.
The CJEU held that where a court in a Schengen Member State had made a determination of double jeopardy, other Member States were bound by it.
The CJEU also held that once a court in one Member State had made such a determination, to arrest in another EU Member State on a Red Notice would amount to ‘further prosecution’ and thus an unlawful restriction on the person’s freedom of movement, effectively applying double jeopardy to Interpol proceedings inside the European Union.
The CJEU further held it would be unlawful to record a person’s personal data on a wanted list if the individual was protected from further prosecution by a judicial determination unless the data is accompanied by a note recognising the protection from further prosecution.
Interestingly, the CJEU was also asked to consider whether Interpol, being an international organisation, has an adequate level of data protection for the purposes of the EU Law Enforcement Directive.[26] The Directive provides that data must not be transferred to a third country or international organisation unless there is:
- an adequacy decision from the European Commission;
- ‘appropriate safeguards’, which include a legally binding instrument and a risk assessment; or
- exceptional circumstances, such as an immediate threat to public security.
It was observed that there is no adequacy decision in respect of Interpol. As the CJEU noted, the German court appeared to be asking it to confirm its view that Interpol does not have an adequate level of data protection under the Law Enforcement Directive. The CJEU sidestepped the issue, declaring the German court’s question inadmissible as it did not bear direct relation to the facts of the WS v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland case.
The German court made an interesting and forceful argument. There does not appear to be a lawful basis for EU Member States sharing data with Interpol absent ‘appropriate safeguards’ in individual Member States. Arguably this applies to the United Kingdom too, where, irrespective of Brexit, the Law Enforcement Directive has been transcribed into law by Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Practitioners are referred to section 73 of the Data Protection Act 2018, which is considered above.
9 Criticisms of Interpol
Interpol tries hard to paint itself as a neutral conduit for law enforcement data sharing but the reality often falls far short. Interpol’s principles of equal access for member countries combined with a lack of proactive checks on the contents of Red Notices means that many are improperly targeted. This may be due to bad faith on the part of the issuing state (such as China’s Red Notice targeting World Uyghur Congress chair Dolkun Isa) or simply because poor-quality Red Notices pass through Interpol’s systems without challenge; for example, a Red Notice might target a person for writing a bounced cheque, despite Interpol itself recognising that this is generally a civil rather than a criminal matter.
Interpol has sought to improve its quality control, such as with the introduction of the NDTF, but, as noted above, the NDTF rarely refuses a request for a Red Notice.
Interpol has been subject to repeated criticism for its opaque procedures, which is compounded by its lack of accountability. As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated in Resolution 2161 of 2017:
Targeted persons cannot successfully challenge Red Notices before any national or international courts. This jurisdictional immunity can only be justified insofar as an internal appeals mechanism provides an effective remedy, in accordance with applicable human rights standards.[27]
In this respect, Interpol’s CCF has been criticised for being ill-equipped to deal with the large and growing number of complaints and their complexity.
In 2019, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe returned to the subject, stating in Resolution 2315 that the CCF needed to strengthen its procedure by making it more transparent and speedier, and that there needed to be greater accountability for states that abused Interpol’s instruments.[28]
In 2021, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee found:
Despite extensive efforts at reform, there are still significant structural and governance issues within Interpol that allow states, including Turkey, Russia, and China, to repeatedly attempt to use Red Notice and Diffusion functions in an abusive way with no remedial action taken against them. Governance and funding structures allow for unacceptable interference by both state and non-state actors. Refusal by the UK Government and the Interpol secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem sends a message to would-be-abusers that this behaviour is acceptable, and it has the potential to constrict reform as well as supporting victims in the UK. The resulting failure of the international community and the secretariat to bring remedial action against those who repeatedly attempt to misuse the system allows this corrosive behaviour to go unchecked.[29]
Neither Interpol nor the CCF publishes any information about which states are the serial offenders regarding non-compliant requests. Since 2012, the General Secretariat has had the power (contained in Chapter 3 of the RPD) to apply ‘corrective measures’ up to and including suspension of data processing rights.
Corrective measures were applied to Syria in 2012 but lifted in 2021. It is unclear whether Syria’s data processing rights were ever fully suspended.
In 2022, Interpol applied corrective measures to Russia in that it was no longer permitted to transmit any Diffusions directly to other countries. Instead they must be sent to the General Secretariat first to be checked for compliance.
It is not known whether any other states are currently subject to corrective measures. Interpol’s website simply states that since 2012 ‘interim and corrective measures have been applied with regard to different NCBs on different occasions’.[30] The impact of any such measures (and the confidence they inspire) is thus severely restricted.
Interpol has also been criticised for its refusal to admit Taiwan, which is based on the organisation’s recognition of People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of China. This is arguably at odds with its supposed political neutrality and also its principle of seeking the widest possible cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and leaves a significant capability gap, given Taiwan’s significance to the global economy.
Interpol’s leadership is controversial. Its president, Major General Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi, is facing allegations of torture relating to his tenure as a police chief in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This includes the alleged torture of British citizens Matthew Hedges and Ali Issa Ahmad.[31] In 2021, Mr Hedges and Mr Ahmad brought claims against Major General Al-Raisi and three other UAE officials in the High Court of England and Wales, albeit these were later withdrawn on jurisdictional grounds.[32]
10 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to outline Interpol’s internal laws and processes and set out the means of challenge for a Notice or Diffusion. It has also described some of the difficulties in engaging with the organisation. As has been seen, a Notice or Diffusion can have serious consequences for an individual and yet the safeguards on Interpol’s processes are limited, since, as previously stated, Interpol is largely accountable only to itself.
Practitioners seeking to pre-empt or to challenge a Notice or Diffusion should have careful regard to Interpol’s internal laws and processes, and will need to give realistic advice about prospects of success and timescales. Depending on the facts of the client’s case, and the jurisdiction, there are a range of collateral challenges that can be explored, some of which have been described in this chapter.
Endnotes
[1] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/General-Secretariat.
[2] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Governance/General-Assembly.
[3] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Governance/Executive-Committee.
[4] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL-s-Files-CCF/About-the-CCF.
[5] https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/About-Notices.
[6] Currently Australia, Canada, Iceland, Lichtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.
[7] See Gonzalez-Castillo v. Garland, 47 F.4th 971 (9th Cir. 2022).
[8] See https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/un-committee-against-torture-requests-morocco-halt-extradition-idris-hasan.
[9] https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmfaff/199/19918.htm.
[10] https://www.fairtrials.org/articles/case-studies/nikita-kulachenkov/.
[11] See https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents.
[12] The leaked decision of the Commission for the Control of Files (Ref. CCF/113/R698A.19) can be found at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23300326-interpol-reversal-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-red-notice.
[13] See https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Data-protection. The latest update of the Rules is effective as of 7 November 2024 but had not been published at the time of writing.
[14] See https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents.
[15] See https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Governance/General-Assembly.
[16] See footnote 13.
[17] See https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Compliance-and-review.
[18] Data is available at https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Compliance-and-review.
[19] Resolution AGN/20/RES/11: Request for international inquiries: see, e.g., https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9437e6/pdf/.
[20] Resolution GA/1984/53/RES/7: Application of Article 3 of the Constitution, https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/6482/file/GA-1984-53-RES-7.pdf.
[21] https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/5746/file/GA-2017-86-RES-09%20-%20INTERPOL%20policy%20on%20refugees.pdf.
[22] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-Interpol-s-Files-CCF/CCF-sessions-and-decisions.
[23] Available at https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/20967/file/GA-2023-91-REP-22%20E%20AnnualActivityReportCCF_2022%20%2823Y2486%29%20%28REV%29%282%29.pdf. The 2024 annual report was approved at the General Assembly in November 2024.
[24] https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-Interpol-s-Files-CCF/How-to-submit-a-request.
[25] C505/19 ECLI:EU:C:2021:376 (12 May 2021).
[26] Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
[27] See ‘Abusive use of the Interpol system: the need for more stringent legal safeguards’ (Apr. 2017), at [6], https://pace.coe.int/en/files/23714.
[28] See ‘Interpol reform and extradition proceedings: building trust by fighting abuse’ (Nov. 2019), https://pace.coe.int/en/files/28303.
[29] UK Parliament, ‘In the room: the UK’s role in multilateral diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, HC199, published 17 June 2021 (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmfaff/199/19903.htm).
[30] https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Compliance-and-review.
[31] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/20/uae-nominee-interpol-ahmed-naser-al-raisi-torture-claims.
[32] https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/our-news/press-releases/claims-by-matthew-hedges-and-ali-issa-ahmad-against-uae-officials-dismissed.
Ben Keith
leading barrister
5 St Andrew’s Hillbenkeith@5sah.co.uk
Amy Woolfson
Defence extradition barrister
5 St Andrew’s Hillamywoolfson@5sah.co.uk
