Contents
II. History of the Karakalpaks and their Republic.
2.1 Karakalpakstan in the Soviet era.
2.2 Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan.
1.1. Drying up of the Aral Sea.
2.2. Neglect and Exploitation.
3.1. Karakalpakstan political representation.
3.2 Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state.
3.3 The Constitutional Reforms.
3.4. The events of 2022 and political repression.
3.3 Human rights in Karakalpakstan.
Freedom of Press and Media and Freedom of Speech.
Arrest, detention and judicial proceedings.
Overcrowding and Poor Conditions.
Opposition Politicians and Activists.
I. Introduction
The Republic of Karakalpakstan is not a country, but a sovereign republic within Uzbekistan. It is home to a Central Asian ethnic minority, the indigenous Karakalpak people. The people of Karakalpakstan, particularly those who are Karakalpaks, are experiencing a significant humanitarian crisis. The region is facing a number of challenges, including extreme poverty, a lack of access to water and healthcare, as well as a lack of fundamental rights such as democratic elections, freedom of expression, cultural rights etc.
The failure to meet humanitarian standards for the Karakalpaks can be attributed to two key factors: The political framework in Uzbekistan and the geo-ecological situation surrounding the disaster of the Aral Sea.
The following report aims to illustrate and elaborate on the extent of these issues and how they have developed. To this end, the history of the Karakalpaks and their region is presented first (II.). Building on this, today’s ecological (III.1.), social-economic (III.2.) and political (III.3.) problems of the region are outlined.
II. History of the Karakalpaks and Karakalpakstan
The following is a brief background of the Karakalpak people (1). and the circumstances which led to the creation of their sovereign Republic (2.).
1. The Karakalpaks
Coverage: Ethnic Group; Representation numbers; Collective identity; Populations centres and first autonomous oblast.
The Karakalpaks are a Central Asian ethnic minority[1] whose exact representation to date can only be estimated, says Dr Igor Savin[2], in an Interview with the ‘International Centre for Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity Studies’ (“ICELDS”).[3] In the Republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan, figures range from around 700,000 to 1.2 million Karakalpaks, while tens to hundreds of thousands more possibly live in Kazakhstan and Russia.[4]
Regardless of their population size, the Karakalpaks have a strong sense of collective/national identity, which is rooted, among other things, in their own language and their adherence to Sunni Islam.[5]
“Karakalpaks have their own rich culture, their own mentality and a strong sense of identity” (translation by us), says Darina Solod[6] in an interview with the German news portal tagesschau.de. [7]Dr. Igor Savin (s.a.) expresses similar sentiments: “The expert data confirms that the Karakalpak language plays an important role in the daily communication of the Karakalpaks, and it is a powerful symbol of their consolidation. The language and the distinctiveness of the Karakalpak culture are not publicly questioned”.[8]
In the 15th or 16th century, the first formations of the Karakalpaks as a union may have taken place.[9] To this day, the descendants of this union have had many regional population centers and state affiliations.[10]
2. Their Republic
2.1 Karakalpakstan in the Soviet era
Coverage: Karakalpak ASSR part of different Republics; Traditional fishing economy: example: Muynak the flourishing port village in the beginning of the 20th century; Soviets radical agriculture politics causing the shrinking of the Aral Sea; Downfall of the Soviet Union
In the Soviet era the Karakalpaks first formed their autonomous oblast in 1924, which, until 1930, was part of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (“ASSR”).[11] In 1932 Karakalpakstan itself was declared an ASSR.[12] Under the 1936 Soviet constitution, the Karakalpakstan ASSR became part of the Uzbek SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic),[13] leaving Karakalpakstan as the only autonomous republic that was not upgraded to an SSR.[14]
At that time, the majority of the Karakalpak people made their living from their traditional occupation – fishing.[15] At the beginning of the 20th century, for example, the present-day city of Muynak was a bustling port village.[16] Like many other areas in Karakalpakstan, at that time, located directly on the shore of the Aral Sea, Muynak “was so prominent that fisherman from other Soviet Republics would come here to work. The town was abundant with various commercial fish species, supplying not only Uzbekistan but also other Soviet republics with canned fish”.[17]
60 years ago, the Aral Sea was the world’s fourth largest lake[18] and produced more than 48.000 tons of fish.[19] Thousands of tons of these were processed in Muynak alone.[20]
But in the 1950s and 60s, the government of the Soviet Union began installing a huge irrigation system to enable intensive agriculture in the region.[21] With “disastrous consequences”, states the European Investment bank: “Over time, ageing and deteriorating irrigation and drainage systems caused secondary soil salinisation and waterlogging, turning the land into a desert and rendering it useless. In an attempt to remedy the situation and decrease the amount of salt in the soil, the Soviet authorities […] diverted a huge volume of water from the Amu Darya River, a major contributor to the landlocked Aral Sea”.[22] As a result, the once mighty lake is shrinking.
After the downfall of the Soviet Union, the Karakalpak region briefly gained state sovereignty. However, it officially became part of Uzbekistan again in 1993.[23]
2.2 Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan
Coverage: Reintegration of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan; Article 74 of the Uzbek Constitution; Authoritarian leadership; gradual removal of those supporting the idea of independence after the reintegration; Attempts of “Uzbekisation” of the Karakalpaks; Neglect and exploitation under former president Karimov.
When Karakalpakstan became part of Uzbekistan again, the Uzbek parliament in return allowed an independence referendum to be held 20 years later.[24] Article 74 of the Uzbek Constitution of 8 December 1992 says: “The Republic of Karakalpakstan is entitled to separate from the Republic of Uzbekistan, for which this decision must be taken by a general referendum in Karakalpakstan“ (translation by us).[25] The right to independence can also be found in Article 1 of the Karakalpak Constitution.[26]
Dr Igor Savin comments on the cause of the reintegration of Karakalpakstan into Uzbekistan as follows: „Islom Karimov wanted to secure the loyalty of the elite and the people of Karakalpakstan by demonstrating his support for their desire for independence. […] In 1993, the banners ‘What a big one needs, a small one needs too’ hung everywhere in Karakalpakstan and symbolized Karimov’s support for the aspirations of the Karakalpak elite. Apparently, this was only a maneuver. Having strengthened his power, Karimov gradually began to remove those who supported the idea of independence from the political elite of Karakalpakstan. Later, common people began to be afraid to express these ideas” (emphasis added by us). [27]
It seems that since their reintegration, the Karakalpaks have been confronted with a policy that seeks to deny them the expression of their desire for independence and their cultural rights. The news portal ‘Hook’ speaks of the ‘Uzbekisation’ of the Karakalpaks.[28] Dr Igor Savin shares this view: “The language and the distinctiveness of the Karakalpak culture are not publicly questioned. However, imperceptible and gradual endeavors to reduce their influence are under way. Several years ago, Islom Karimov, the then President of Uzbekistan, announced the Year of Mahalla (a special type of local community common for many Muslim nations). However, this type of settlement is not typical for Karakalpaks. Nevertheless, the authorities began to introduce similar forms of local self-government in Karakalpakstan. The same is true for the so-called mahalla mosques. Being usual for the rest of Uzbekistan, they are not common within the Karakalpak tradition. In general, Islam plays a lesser important role in the everyday life of the Karakalpaks, compared to the Uzbeks” (emphasis added by us).[29]
Also, other indications give the impression that since the reintegration of Karakalpakstan into Uzbekistan, the region had been neglected and exploited under former President Karimov. The Medicines-Sans-Frontiers-Organization discovered that in 2002 the “total spending on health care in Karakalpakstan was 10.1 billion som (approximately US $10 million, according to the official bank rate) or US$ 6.5 per inhabitant per year”, which is remarkably low: “According to the World Health Organization (WHO), no country can offer effective basic health care to its population without spending at least US$60 per person per year on health”.[30]
Aziz Berdiqulov[31] says that once the Interstate Treaty with Uzbekistan was signed, the gas and oil reserves of Karakalpakstan were exploited, yet the resulting income bypassed Nukus (Karakalpakstan’s capital) and was directed directly to Tashkent (Uzbekistan’s capital). [32]
III. Karakalpakstan today
All this has resulted in a very dire humanitarian situation in Karakalpakstan. The effects of the Aral Sea disaster and the worsening economic situation are affecting the health of the Karakalpaks, while the political framework denies them basic rights and oppresses them.
Focusing on the problems they inherit for the Karakalpak people, the following section assesses the environmental (1.), social-economic (2.) and political (3.) situation of Karakalpakstan.
1. Ecological Situation
Coverage: Almost dried up Aral Sea: Example: Muynak, now 150 kilometers away from the shores of the lake; Toxic dust
1.1. Drying up of the Aral Sea
Ever since the Soviet government turned the desert into cotton fields (s.a. II.2.1), the Aral Sea has been slowly disappearing.[33] Once the world’s fourth largest lake, covering an area of 67,000 square kilometers, it is today almost entirely dried-up.[34]
By 1987, the water level of the Aral Sea had already dropped so low that it split into two bodies of water: a northern lake in Kazakhstan and a much larger southern lake in Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. By 2002, the southern lake had silted up so much that it had become two lakes, one eastern and one western. By July 2014, the eastern lake was completely dry.[35]
While the Kazakh part was saved by a dam, the southern part continues to silt up.[36] Fisheries and communities that depended on the Sea collapsed.[37] Today the shores of the lake are 150 kilometers away from the former fishing village Muynak.[38] The city that once was only to get to by sea or by plane is now an object of interest for its so called ‘ship graveyard’ – “an empty sandy place strewn with rusty monuments that now remind local people about the blue and stormy sea”.[39]
1.2. Impact on Health
“Many health indicators, including rates of maternal mortality, respiratory and diarrhoeal disease, are high, and are worse in Karakalpakstan than the rest of the country”.[40]
“[T]wo sets of health issues can be described in Karakalpakstan […]. The first are those diseases and health conditions that are linked to deteriorating economic situation, poverty, and an under-funded health service. […]. The other set, more directly linked to the environmental destruction, is a range of complex chronic health problems […]. The potential of the environmental disaster directly impacting human health lies within such concerns as the salinisation of the water table, pesticides in the environment and food chain, and dust storms and air quality” (emphasis added by us).[41]
So, while the health problems in Karakalpakstan are multi-factorial, the drying up of the Aral Sea in particular has fueled the following:
- Water crisis: That “[a]ccess to safe drinking water is a pressing issue in this region” was noted years ago.[42] And although the situation is improving with the help of other governments and aid agencies[43], access to drinking water in Karakalpakstan remains an ongoing challenge.[44] The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers flow through several countries. However, due to economic dependence, the thirsty cotton and rice plants are still harvested today.[45] This requires large amounts of water, so that often little of either river is left for downstream Karakalpakstan,[46] whose people claim to have little to say in what happens in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya: “This is discrimination based on geographical location” (translation by us), says a Karakalpak in an interview with National Geographic.[47]
- Nutrient deficiencies: The drying up of the Aral Sea has led to a high level of soil salination. This means that few can grow vegetables in their gardens, and the high rates of poverty among local families means that some cannot afford to by the imported food available at the bazaar.[48]
- Dust storms: “The spread of atmospheric air pollution caused by dust storms has led to respiratory diseases such as chronic bronchitis, bronchial asthma, and tuberculosis”.[49] The people of Karakalpakstan are facing about ten raging dust storms per year, visible from space, which originate from the now exposed seabed of the Aral Sea.[50] The circulating dust not only contains highly toxic concentrations of salt, but also pesticides such as hexachlorocyclohexane, toxaphene and phosalone, all of which are carcinogenic substances.[51]
2. Social-Economic Situation
Coverage: Karakalpakstan suffering from poverty; General numbers; neglect and exploitation under current leadership
2.1. Numbers
“Karakalpakstan is one of the two poorest regions of Uzbekistan, and the Karakalpak population suffers high levels of poverty, unemployment and poor health than their Uzbek neighbors” (emphasis added by us).[52]
In Karakalpakstan, 28.8% of GRP is created in agriculture, fisheries and forestry, 26.7% in the industrial sector and a little more than a third in the service sector.[53]
In 2020, the average total per capita income of the population of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, 9 159.8 thousand Uzbek som, was about one third less than that of the rest of Uzbekistan.[54]
Because of the economic conditions, many Karakalpaks migrated to other parts of Uzbekistan or to Kazakhstan, where they often face discrimination.[55]
2.2. Neglect and Exploitation
Several sources suggest that Karakalpakstan is not receiving the support from the government that it would need in view of the unfortunate humanitarian situation, but on the contrary is being exploited.
In 2021, Karakalpakstan benefitted the least from investment compared to any region in Uzbekistan.[56]
Karakalpakstan has had to rely on foreign funding in the past because Uzbekistan’s efforts to improve welfare under the new government (‘Welfare Improvement Strategy of Uzbekistan’) have failed to have a regionally balanced economic impact. [57]
Allegedly, Karakalpakstan does not benefit from the income of its mineral resources which are accumulated by the central government. Dr Igor Savin (s.a.) says: “Similarly, all incomes from all types of natural resources are accumulated in Tashkent. The estimations, that I heard during my personal communication with Sagidullaev, are so that the natural resources annually mined in Karakalpakstan cost around 4 billion USD, whereas budgetary subsidies allocated to the republic from the center constitute approximately 150 million USD. However, since all important decisions are made in closed mode, it is not possible either to confirm or to disprove these figures” (emphasis added by us). [58]
3. Political Situation
Coverage: Karakalpakstan political representation; Uzbekistan’s politics (authoritarian state, elections do not meet democratic standards); The constitutional reforms; The events of 2022, Human rights in Karakalpakstan
3.1. Karakalpakstan political representation
Karakalpakstan is governed by the Joqargi Kenes (Parliament) from the capital city of Nukus and has a permanent representative office in Tashkent. In line with the Karakalpak Constitution, citizens of Karakalpakstan are citizens of Uzbekistan.[59]
Authorities in the republic have however no independence; Important appointments are coordinated and decided by the central authorities,[60] and most importantly, considering the restrictions around creating new political parties, elected representatives of the republic are generally aligned with the central power.
3.2 Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state
The president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, took office in 2016 via irregular presidential elections after Islam Karimov, his authoritarian predecessor, suffered a stroke and died.[61] Previously, Mirziyoyev served as Prime Minister under Karimov since 2003.[62]
Ever since Miriyoyev was reelected in 2021 and 2023. Different sources claim that both elections were neither free nor fair.[63] In 2021, the Social Democratic Party ‘Truth and Progress’ and the ‘Peoples’ Interests Party’ were denied registration because they, allegedly, did not meet the required amount for collected signatures. [64]
Based on an Election Observation Report by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (“ODIHR”), the presidential election in 2023 took place in a political environment lacking genuine competition and voters’ ability to make an informed choice.[65] Apparently, there are effective burdensome requirements for party registration,[66] the political parties that are registered and represented in the parliament, however, all openly endorse the president’s policies.[67] Open discussions of social and political issues are undermined by restrictive legal provisions[68], interference with editorial independence[69] and the use of criminal penalties.[70]
The election process in 2023 itself was impacted by democratic shortcomings. Among other things, the ODIHR claims to have observed:[71]
– Indications of ballot box stuffing and numerous seemingly identical signatures,
– large numbers of voters added to supplementary voter lists without proper safeguards,
– significant procedural errors and omissions in the counting process,
– discrepancies between the number of voters casting their ballots and the officially reported preliminary turnout figures.
3.3 The Constitutional Reforms
The recent constitutional reforms in Karakalpakstan have significantly altered the political and legal landscape of the region, sparking widespread controversy and unrest. The most contentious aspect of these reforms was the proposed removal of Karakalpakstan’s right to secede from Uzbekistan, a provision that had been enshrined in the constitution since Karakalpakstan’s incorporation into Uzbekistan in 1936. Although this right had never been exercised, it symbolized the region’s autonomy and was a critical component of its political identity.
In June 2022, the Uzbek government introduced a draft amendment to the constitution that would have eliminated Karakalpakstan’s secession rights and further reduced its sovereign status. This proposal was met with immediate and strong opposition from the people of Karakalpakstan, who viewed it as an existential threat to their autonomy and identity. Massive protests erupted across the region, with thousands of citizens taking to the streets to demand the withdrawal of the amendment.
The government’s response was swift and severe, deploying security forces to suppress the protests, leading to violent clashes, numerous casualties,[72] and widespread arrests.[73] The scale of the unrest forced the Uzbek government to temporarily backtrack on the proposed changes, and the controversial amendment was ultimately withdrawn. However, the episode has left a lasting impact on the region, deepening mistrust between Karakalpakstan and the central government.
While the secession clause was retained, the constitutional reform process did not entirely restore confidence among the people of Karakalpakstan. Other amendments included provisions that effectively consolidated Tashkent’s control over the region, limiting Karakalpakstan’s ability to govern itself independently. These changes have been perceived as part of a broader effort by the central government to tighten its grip on Karakalpakstan, further eroding the region’s autonomy in practice, even if some symbolic aspects remain intact.
The reform process has also raised concerns about the lack of genuine consultation with the people of Karakalpakstan. Many locals and political analysts argue that the constitutional changes were imposed without adequate input from the region’s population, reflecting a broader pattern of top-down governance that sidelines the voices of Karakalpak citizens. This approach has only heightened tensions and contributed to a growing sense of disenfranchisement and alienation within the region.
Thus, the recent constitutional reforms in Karakalpakstan have been highly contentious, leading to significant unrest and raising serious questions about the future of the region’s autonomy. Although the most controversial amendment was withdrawn, the broader implications of the reforms suggest a continuing trend toward centralization and reduced self-governance, further complicating the relationship between Karakalpakstan and the Uzbek government.
3.4. The events of 2022 and political repression
The political landscape in Karakalpakstan has been marked by increasing levels of repression, particularly in the wake of the 2022 protests that shook the region. These protests were sparked by proposed constitutional amendments that threatened to strip Karakalpakstan of its sovereign status, igniting widespread unrest. The Uzbek government responded with a harsh crackdown, deploying security forces to suppress demonstrations, resulting in numerous casualties and mass detentions.
Since the protests, the authorities have intensified their grip on the region, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens who dare to express dissent. Reports of arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and the use of excessive force by law enforcement have become commonplace. The government has also curtailed freedom of expression by tightening control over the media and blocking access to social media platforms during periods of unrest, as illustrated in previous sections, further stifling the voices of those critical of the regime.
Human rights organizations have raised alarm over the deteriorating situation, citing instances of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in custody. The lack of transparent legal processes and the suppression of independent legal representation have exacerbated concerns about the rule of law in Karakalpakstan. The region’s judicial system is seen as heavily influenced by the central government, with little room for impartiality or fair trials for those accused of political crimes.
Moreover, the broader context of political repression in Karakalpakstan is closely tied to the central government’s efforts to consolidate power and control over the region. The ongoing repression is not only a response to specific incidents of unrest but also part of a broader strategy to undermine any potential separatist sentiment and ensure that Karakalpakstan remains firmly under Tashkent’s control. This has led to a climate of fear and self-censorship among the local population, as many are wary of the consequences of opposing the government’s policies.
Political repression in Karakalpakstan has escalated significantly in recent years, characterized by the use of force, legal persecution, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms. The situation remains a critical human rights concern, with ongoing efforts by the Uzbek government to silence dissent and maintain its dominance over the region.
3.3 Human rights in Karakalpakstan
Freedom of Press and Media and Freedom of Speech
It was expected that the change of government after the death of Islam Karimov would bring positive change with respect to independent press and media, freedom of speech and freedom of expressions, in particular after a number of journalists and political prisoners were released in the first years of presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. However, the outcome today is a rather negative one. While public media work as a relay of the regime propaganda, private media – registered as such with authorities – remain cautious in their activity, admitting to self-censoring the information they relay in fear of consequences. In parallel, many independent journalists or bloggers, but also individuals, have been shut down, threatened and/or subject to administrative and criminal sanctions.[74]
From a legal perspective, a repressive framework remains which forces many organizations refrain from registering as official media in the fear of heavy sanctions.[75] Further, “insulting the president online” remains a criminal offence and a frequent ground to arrest journalists as well as individuals, together with “attempting to overthrow the Constitutional order of Uzbekistan” and “mass riots“.[76] As point of comparison, it must be noted that the UN Human Rights Committee commented “the mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties.” [77] Yet, those charges have served as basis for the trial of many journalists and bloggers with respect to the 2022 events, both for those present in Uzbekistan[78] and others in absentia.[79] Additionally, over the last couple years, many reports of citizens being prosecuted and imprisoned for the same charges have come through, based on social media content shared, followed, subscribed to or “liked” by those individuals.[80] In some cases, while not judicially prosecuted, individuals report having been subject to intimidation, administrative sanctions and/or arbitrary detention.[81] It is further noted that out of those condemned – for example as part of the 2022 events coverage – very few plead their innocence in appeal (but decide to repent instead),[82] and in previous occurrences many such individuals also had agreed to sign written undertaking to “cease their suspicious activities“,[83] making it look probable that intimidation practices were applied and effective.
In parallel, under the pressure of the governmental authorities, it must be noted that an increasing number of social media channels and blogs have been closed,[84] complicating further the work of independent journalism.
Freedom of Movement
Despite both the Uzbek Constitution and the Karakalpak Constitution providing for the freedom of movement of their citizens within Uzbekistan (including choice of residence), entry and exit thereof, apart from any restrictions established by law,[85] such legal hurdles (propiska)remain in fact quite heavy, inherited from the Soviet regime.
Within Uzbekistan, each citizen must register their permanent residence – as well as their temporary residence, where applicable – and any change thereof must be approved by the local police.[86] Not complying with this registration requirement hinders access to employment, housing, medical care, education, marriage, etc.[87] It is reported that de facto such permits to live in a specific place (and in particular in the capital city, Tashkent, or other urban areas) are often denied unless the local police is paid a bribe. Such a system effectively discriminates against rural population,[88] with critically low international migration rates.[89] Unfortunately, recent changes to the system (allowing people to work in a different place, but not linking this right to allowing them to reside in such a place) has done little to improve the situation.[90]
External migration has also been historically strictly controlled, with exit visas having been in place until 2019, mainly for human rights and civil activists or independent journalists.[91] Yet, even from abroad, the influence of the Uzbek government remains strong as Uzbek nationals must supposedly obtain the President’s approval either to permanently reside abroad and/or to renounce their nationality in order to obtain a new one:[92] This in turn has been used as a way to exercise political pressure on Karakalpak activists living abroad.[93]
In terms of provision of passports, a law on On the establishment of a system for issuing the biometric passport of a citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan abroad and on additional measures to modernize the biometric passport system of the Republic of Uzbekistan[94]. Chapter 3 of this law established the grounds for refusal from the State to issue a biometric passport for a citizen travelling abroad. These include:
- If the person is under administrative control of internal affairs bodies – until the control is terminated (on the basis of a written letter from the body exercising administrative control);
- If the competent authorities have information about the person indicating that it would be inappropriate for that person to travel abroad;
In essence, under these specified grounds, activists under surveillance (or “administrative control”), who may not even know that are under said surveillance, may be denied a passport, thus the right to leave the country. This also indicates that Uzbek authorities have the power of deciding whether human rights activists, for instance, can leave the country to attend relevant fora about human rights. There are no grounds for appealing the decision of refusal of grant of passport.
Cultural rights
Cultural rights in Karakalpakstan have been increasingly under threat, as the region’s unique identity faces challenges from both state policies and broader social dynamics. Karakalpakstan, with its distinct language, traditions, and cultural heritage, has long struggled to preserve its identity within the larger framework of Uzbekistan. Despite formal recognition of Karakalpak autonomy, efforts to promote and protect the Karakalpak language and culture have been insufficient, and in some cases, actively undermined by central government policies.
One of the most significant issues is the marginalization of the Karakalpak language. Uzbek has increasingly become the dominant language in official settings, education, and media, leading to a decline in the use of Karakalpak, particularly among younger generations. While Karakalpak is still taught in schools, there is a growing concern that the language is being relegated to a secondary status, with limited resources allocated for its preservation and promotion. This linguistic shift is seen by many as part of a broader trend of assimilation, where Karakalpak culture is gradually being absorbed into the dominant Uzbek culture. Bloggers who dare to raise the issue of absence of Karakalpak language signs in Karakalpakstan are arrested and persecuted.[95]
The situation is further complicated by restrictions on cultural expression. Cultural activities that emphasize Karakalpak identity, such as traditional music, dance, and literature, often receive less support from the government compared to those aligned with Uzbek national culture. There have been reports of cultural organizations and artists facing difficulties in accessing funding or permits for events that focus on Karakalpak heritage, leading to a stifling of cultural diversity in the region.
Moreover, there are growing concerns about the preservation of Karakalpakstan’s historical sites and artifacts. The region is home to a rich cultural heritage, including ancient fortresses and other archaeological treasures. However, inadequate funding and prioritization for preservation efforts have put these sites at risk. The lack of attention to Karakalpakstan’s cultural heritage can be seen as part of a broader pattern of neglect, where the unique aspects of Karakalpak identity are not given the importance they deserve.
In addition to state policies, economic challenges and demographic shifts also play a role in the erosion of cultural rights. Poverty and migration have led many Karakalpaks to leave their homeland in search of better opportunities, further diluting the region’s cultural fabric. Those who remain often face economic hardship, which limits their ability to engage in and support cultural practices.
In summary, cultural rights in Karakalpakstan are under significant pressure due to linguistic marginalization, limited support for cultural expression, and inadequate preservation of cultural heritage. These challenges reflect broader issues of cultural assimilation and neglect, which threaten the survival of Karakalpakstan’s unique identity in the face of growing centralization and homogenization within Uzbekistan.
Arrest, detention and judicial proceedings
The Uzbek constitution and law prohibit the use of torture, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. Despite recent convictions of officers with respect to the use of torture and violence towards detainees,[96] the ombudsman for human rights acknowledged that torture remains a common practice in Uzbekistan,[97] and while more cases of reported torture are being investigated, comparatively few are effectively prosecuted.[98]
The use of psychological pressure and threats, however, is not considered as an abuse or a mistreatment.[99] Most torture and ill-treatment therefore reportedly occur during interrogations, where police use physical abuse and psychological coercion to gain confessions, incriminating information, or for corrupt financial gain.”[100] Reported methods of torture included severe beatings, denial of food, simulated asphyxiation, tying and hanging by the hands, and electric shock. There were also continued reports that authorities exerted psychological pressure on inmates and detainees, including through threats against family members and blackmail.“[101] There are reports of use and threat of use of sexual violence against the detained.[102]
The detention and mistreatment of family members is also commonly reported as a mean of pressure for example to pressure and break up allegedly extremist religious groups, as well as the harassment of family members of human rights activists.[103]
Prison conditions
Torture and ill-treatment
One of the most persistent issues in Uzbek prisons is the use of torture. Torture and ill-treatment in detention remained widespread, with little accountability for those responsible. Despite 2021 recommendations for reform, no progress was made. A parliamentary commission investigating violence in Karakalpakstan, including torture, failed to publish its findings. There are concerns about the health of detainees Daulemurat Tazhimuratov/Tajimuratov[104], Saadatdin Reimov[105] and Zhumasapar Dadebaev[106], Karakalpak activists held in prison. Blogger Abdukodir Muminov[107] reported severe torture by police, but the court did not investigate his claims. Torture and Ill-Treatment are highlighted in reports from various human rights organizations, such as
Amnesty International[108], Human Rights Watch[109], UN Human Rights on Torture[110] also US. Department 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan[111]. These reports have highlighted numerous cases where inmates have been subjected to physical and psychological abuse. These abuses are often carried out to extract confessions or as punishment for perceived dissent. Methods include beatings, electric shocks, and sexual violence.
Overcrowding and Poor Conditions
Overcrowding is another major problem in Uzbek prisons. The facilities are often filled beyond capacity, leading to inadequate access to essential services like healthcare, food, and sanitation. According to Association Central Asia[112] these poor living conditions contribute to a high incidence of diseases and a significant mortality rate among prisoners. The lack of medical care exacerbates these issues, with many inmates left to suffer from untreated illnesses.
Political Prisoners
Uzbekistan has a history of imprisoning individuals on politically motivated charges. Journalists, human rights defenders, and religious minorities are particularly at risk. Although President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s government has released some political prisoners, others remain behind bars, and new arrests continue to occur. Uzbekistan has a long history of imprisoning journalists who challenge the state’s narrative. Many reporters have been jailed for exposing corruption, human rights abuses, or simply for voicing dissent. A notorious case was that of Muhammad Bekjanov[113], the former editor of the opposition newspaper Erk, who was imprisoned for 18 years and endured severe torture. Although he was released in 2017, many journalists continue to be targeted under vague charges like defamation or extremism.
Human Rights Defenders
Human rights defenders often find themselves on the front lines of Uzbekistan’s battle between state control and individual freedoms. Activists working on issues such as prisoner rights, freedom of speech, and religious liberty have been imprisoned on charges that are often widely seen as politically motivated. For instance, Azam Farmonov[114], a human rights advocate, spent 11 years in prison under harsh conditions after being convicted on what many believe were trumped-up charges. Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov[115] a human rights defender from Karakalpakstan was sentenced to 16 years in maximum security prison where he suffered from several threats and ill treatment.
Opposition Politicians and Activists
Opposition politicians in Uzbekistan face significant risks. Many are arrested on charges such as corruption, extremism, or plotting against the state, which are often seen as politically motivated. One such case is that of Sanjar Umarov[116], an opposition leader who was sentenced to 14 years in prison on charges of embezzlement. His case, like many others, underscores the dangers faced by those who challenge the political status quo in Uzbekistan.
Religious Minorities
Religious persecution is another major concern in Uzbekistan, where practicing faith outside state-sanctioned boundaries can lead to imprisonment. This includes Muslims who follow independent religious leaders, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses and other minority religious groups. Those who are arrested often face long sentences and are subjected to harsh conditions, including torture and forced confessions. An estimated 2,000 people remain imprisoned in Uzbekistan for peacefully practicing their religious beliefs, a report[117] by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has found.
Since President Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, there have been some attempts to reform the prison system. However, there has been no real difference.
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[2] Senior Research Fellow, head of Central Asian sector in Centre on research of Central Asia and Caucasus, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (Since 2007), Leading Research Fellow in Center “History and Ethnology”, South Kazakh State University (since 2011). He also worked in several international projects focusing on Minority issues in Kazakhstan and Central Asia in collaboration with High Commissioner on National Minority OSCE since 1998: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6812-7014 (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
[3] International Centre for Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity Studies (ICELDS), Interview with Dr. Igor Savin, Karakalpakstan: a little-known autonomy in the post-Soviet Central Asia, May 10, 2018: https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/ (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
[4] Ibid., ICELDS, Interview with Dr. Igor Savin: “No census has been conducted in Uzbekistan since 1989. Therefore, there are only estimations. According to the website of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, there are 708,800 Karakalpaks living throughout the entire country, while the whole population of Karakalpakstan is 1,818,000 people. Aman Sagidullaev, the leader of the unregistered pro-independence movement Alga Karakalpakstan, argues that there are 2.2 million people living in Karakalpakstan, of whom 1.2 million (60 percent) are ethnic Karakalpaks. […]. There are also estimates that approximately 300,000 Karakalpaks live in Kazakhstan, while another 100,000 reside in Russia. However, the results of the 2009 National Census in Kazakhstan show that only 2,800 Karakalpaks lived in this country. Meanwhile, several tens or even hundreds of thousands of Karakalpaks might stay in Kazakhstan temporarily”https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/.
[5] Wikipedia, Karakalpaks, last edited on August 31, 2024: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakalpaks (last day of access: September 25, 2024).
[6] Media analyst, editor-in-chief of Hook.report (Uzbek news portal), Graduate of the School of Analytical Journalism CABAR.asia: https://cabar.asia/en/author/darina (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
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[8] S.a., ICELDS, Interview with Dr. Igor Savin, https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/.
[9] S.a., Wikipedia, Karakalpaks, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakalpaks.
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[13] S.a., Berdiqulov, Is Uzbekistan not ready to let it go? https://www.ecmi.de/infochannel/detail/ecmi-minorities-blog-is-uzbekistan-not-ready-to-let-it-go-unrest-in-karakalpakstan.
[14] S.a., Olmos, The curious case of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, https://fpc.org.uk/the-curious-case-of-the-republic-of-karakalpakstan/.
[15] Michelle Robertson, Was ist Karakalpakstan? Ein seltener Einblick: “Half a century ago, the Aral Sea was the fourth largest lake in the world. Now 90 per cent of its water has evaporated. And with it, the traditional source of income: fishing” (translated by us, emphasis added by us), Novastan, July 17, 2016, https://novastan.org/de/usbekistan/was-ist-karakalpakistan-ein-seltener-einblick/ (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
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[24] S.a., Olmos, The curious case of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, https://fpc.org.uk/the-curious-case-of-the-republic-of-karakalpakstan/.
[25] Uzbek Constitution, German Version, https://www.verfassungen.net/uzb/verf92-i.htm (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
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[27] S.a., ICELDS, Interview with Dr. Igor Savin, https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/.
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[30] Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan: A Population in Danger, page 5: https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
[31] Researcher at the European Centre for Minority Issues, founded by the German Federal Government, the Danish Government and the Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein, https://www.ecmi.de/the-centre/about-us/people/azizzhon-berdiqulov (last accessed: September 25, 2024).
[32] S.a., Berdiqulov, Is Uzbekistan not ready to let it go? https://www.ecmi.de/infochannel/detail/ecmi-minorities-blog-is-uzbekistan-not-ready-to-let-it-go-unrest-in-karakalpakstan
[33] Nasa, earth observatory – The Aral Sea, Before the Streams Ran Dry https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/77193/the-aral-sea-before-the-streams-ran-dry.
[34] S.a., Mark Synnott, Es war einmal ein See, https://www.nationalgeographic.de/umwelt/zentralasien-es-war-einmal-ein-see.
[35] S.a., Mark Synnott, Es war einmal ein See, https://www.nationalgeographic.de/umwelt/zentralasien-es-war-einmal-ein-see.
[36] S.a., Mark Synnott, Es war einmal ein See, https://www.nationalgeographic.de/umwelt/zentralasien-es-war-einmal-ein-see; S.a., Chen, Once Written off for Dead, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/north-aral-sea-restoration-fish-kazakhstan.
[37] S.a., Nasa, The Aral Sea, Before the Streams Ran Dry, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/77193/the-aral-sea-before-the-streams-ran-dry.
[38] Wikipedia, Moynaq, last edited July 3, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moynaq (last accessed: October 1, 2024)
[39] The Ship Graveyard, https://bookatour.me/uzbekistan/attraction/ship-graveyard-muynak.html (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[40] S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 2, https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf.
[41] S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 11: https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf .
[42] S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 9:
[43] United Nations Uzbekistan, Residents of two districts of Karakalpakstan received access to drinking water with the support of the Government of Japan, June 14, 2022: https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/residents-two-districts-karakalpakstan-received-access-drinking-water-support-government-japan (last accessed: September 26, 2024).
[44] Press Release, United Nations Launches Projects to Address Environmental and Health Challenges in Karakalpakstan, August 16, 2024: https://uzbekistan.un.org/en/276602-united-nations-launches-projects-address-environmental-and-health-challenges-karakalpakstan (last accessed: September 26, 2024).
[45] S.a., Robertson, Was ist Karakalpakstan?: “The Karakalpak economy now depends on rice, melon and cotton production. The latter requires heavy irrigation and is partly responsible for the destruction of the lake” (emphasis added, translated by us), https://novastan.org/de/usbekistan/was-ist-karakalpakistan-ein-seltener-einblick/; S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 8, https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf.
[46] S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 8, https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf)
[47] S.a., Synnott, Es war einmal ein See, https://www.nationalgeographic.de/umwelt/zentralasien-es-war-einmal-ein-see.
[48] S.a., Medicines-Sans-Frontiers, Karakalpakstan, page 12: https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/sites/default/files/mediathek/entity/document/2003-04-karakalpakstan-report-population-in-danger.pdf.
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[50] Eco-Activists Tackle Dust Storms on Karakalpakstan’s Aral Sea, The Times of Central Asia, February 20, 2024, https://timesca.com/eco-activists-tackle-dust-storms-on-karakalpakstans-aral-sea/ (last accessed: September 30, 2024).
[51] S.a., Mark Synnott, Es war einmal ein See, https://www.nationalgeographic.de/umwelt/zentralasien-es-war-einmal-ein-see.
[52] Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan, Minority Rights Group, last updated September 2018, https://minorityrights.org/communities/karakalpaks/ (last accessed: 30 September, 2024).
[53] Analysis in numbers: how low standards of living and education lead to discontent among the population, Hook, July 27, 2022https://hook.report/2022/07/economics-protests-karakalpakstan/ (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[54] Official figures by the State, Total Income Of Population In The Republic Of Uzbekistan, 2021, page 2, https://www.stat.uz/images/uploads/docs/aholi_daromadlari_en_28012021.pdf (last accessed: September 30, 2024).
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[58] Ibd., ICELDS, Interview with Dr. Igor Savin, https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/.
[59] S.a., Berdiqulov, Is Uzbekistan not ready to let it go? https://www.ecmi.de/infochannel/detail/ecmi-minorities-blog-is-uzbekistan-not-ready-to-let-it-go-unrest-in-karakalpakstan.
[60] S.a., ICELDS, Interview with Dr. Igor Savin, https://www.icelds.org/2018/05/10/karakalpakstan-a-little-known-autonomy-in-the-post-soviet-central-asia/.
[61] Freedom in the World 2024 – Uzbekistan, ecoi.net:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[62] Brief profile of Mirziyoyev, RadioFreeEurope, archived at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20071116173947/http://www.rferl.org/specials/uzbekelections/bios/Mirziyayev.asp (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[63]S.a., Freedom in the World 2024: “Mirziyoyev was reelected in the 2021 presidential elections with 80.1 percent of the vote. The election was not competitive, and candidates avoided challenging or criticizing Mirziyoyev” (emphasis added by us), https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html; Uzbek Leader Mirziyoev Reelected in Scripted Election, RadioFreeEurope, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-presidential-election/32495394.html (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[64] Republic of Uzbekistan, Referendum Observation Mission, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, page 4, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/1/561158_1.pdf (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[65] Election Observation Mission, Republic of Uzbekistan – Early Presidential Elections, 9 July 2023, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, page 1, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/0/548179.pdf (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[66] Ibid.: “Several attempts for registration of political parties have failed and representatives of the unregistered parties have reported intimidation, harassment and hindrances organizing meetings and in collection of signatures of support for the party”,
[67] Ibid.; S.a., Freedom in the World 2024 – Uzbekistan, ecoi.net:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html.
[68] Press release, Uzbekistan’s presidential election lacked genuine political competition despite some efforts to reform, international observers say, ODIHR, July 10, 2023, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/548191 (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., Election Observation Mission, Early Presidential Elections, 9 July 2023, ODIHR, page 4, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/0/548179.pdf.
[71] Ibid., page 3.
[72] Deceased and injured in the July 1-2, 2022 events in Karakalpakstan, Freedom for Eurasia, July 14, 2023, https://freedomforeurasia.org/dead-and-wounded-during-the-events-of-july-1-2-2022-in-karakalpakstan-analysis-and-lists-july-02-2023/ (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[73] Karakalpakstan political prisoners, Freedom for Eurasia, December 10, 2023, https://freedomforeurasia.org/report/karakalpakstan-political-prisoners/ (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[74] Steve Swerdlow, You can’t see them, but they’re always there – Censorship and freedom of the media in Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/28/you-cant-see-them-theyre-always-there/censorship-and-freedom-media-uzbekistan (last accessed: October 1, 2024); S.a., Freedom in the World 2024 – Uzbekistan, ecoi.net:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html.
[75] Uzbekistan, Reporters sans Frontières, https://rsf.org/en/country/uzbekistan (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[76] Articles 158(3), 159(1) and 244(2b) of the Uzbek Criminal Code, as cited in Uzbekistan: Imprisoned for ‘insulting the President online’ – Prosecutions violate free speech, right to liberty, Human Rights Watch, 30 May 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/30/uzbekistan-imprisoned-insulting-president-online (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[77] Freedom of expresión and new media, United Nations Human Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2011/08/freedom-expression-and-new-media#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20mere%20fact%20that%20forms,subject%20to%20criticism%20and%20political (last accessed October 1, 2024).
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[79] Karakalpakstan’s somber 2 year anniversary. Uzbekistan’s Crackdown on Karakalpakstan continues, Freedom for Eurasia, July 1, 2024, https://freedomforeurasia.org/report/karakalpakstans-somber-2-year-anniversary-uzbekistans-crackdown-on-karakalpakstan-continues/ (last accessed October 1, 2024); and Karakalpak victims of transnational repressions. Who are they?, Freedom for Eurasia, May 16, 2024, https://freedomforeurasia.org/karakalpak-victims-of-transnational-repressions-who-are-they/ (last accessed October 1, 2024); Ksenia Polyanitsa, Karakalpak activities detained in Kazakhstan convicted in absentia at home, May 15, 2024, https://en.orda.kz/karakalpak-activists-detained-in-kazakhstan-convicted-in-absentia-at-home-3247/ (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[80] S.a., Uzbekistan: Imprisoned for ‘insulting the President online’ https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/30/uzbekistan-imprisoned-insulting-president-online.
[81] Farangis Najibullah, We’ll kill you’: Karakalpak students face threats, arrest in Uzbekistan for voicing support for anti-government protests, RadioFreeEurope, February 1, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-karakalpakstan-protests-social-media-students/32801532.html (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[82] Uzbekistan: Appeal case of Karakalpakstan protesters nears verdict – Supporters of the most high-profile defendant, Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, say the appeal was rushed and marred by violations, Eurasianet, June 4, 2023, available on Uzbekistan: Appeal case of Karakalpakstan protesters nears verdict | Eurasianet (last consulted on 19 August 2024).
[83] “Ouzbékistan : des utilisateurs de Facebook arrêtés et interrogés”, Amnesty International, 13 September 2018, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-appeal-case-of-karakalpakstan-protesters-nears-verdict (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[84] Vague de fermeture de chaînes d’information Telegram en Ouzbékistan : RSF interpelle le président Mirziyoyev, Reporters sans Frontières, June 16, 2023, https://rsf.org/fr/vague-de-fermeture-de-cha%C3%AEnes-d-information-telegram-en-ouzb%C3%A9kistan-rsf-interpelle-le-pr%C3%A9sident (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[85] Article 32 of the Uzbek Constitution; Article 26 of the Karakalpak Constitution.
[86] Your travel abroad is not appropriate: Propiska, ‘exit visas’ and other relics of the Soviet era in Uzbekistan today, Uzbek-German forum for human rights, 2010, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/droi_20100602_6psuz_/droi_20100602_6psuz_en.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[87] S.a., Your travel abroad is not appropriate; See also Uzbekistan: Planned propiska changes slammed by public, eurasianet, March 19, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-planned-propiska-changes-slammed-by-public (last accessed October 1, 2024); See also William Seitz, Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group, January 2020, p. 19, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ar/595891578495293475/pdf/Free-Movement-and-Affordable-Housing-Public-Preferences-for-Reform-in-Uzbekistan.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[88] Sam Bhutia, Uzbekistan sustains poverty by blocking internal migration, Eurasianet, 15 January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-sustains-poverty-by-blocking-internal-migration (last accessed: 26 august 2024); See also Propiska: Uzbekistan abolishes Soviet-style residency restrictions, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 18 February 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/propiska-uzbekistan-abolishes-soviet-style-residency-restrictions/ (last accessed: 26 August 2024).
[89] With a 0.5% rate in 2018, see William Seitz (S.a.), Free Movement and Affordable Housing, pp. 13-18, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ar/595891578495293475/pdf/Free-Movement-and-Affordable-Housing-Public-Preferences-for-Reform-in-Uzbekistan.pdf.
[90] Uzbekistan: Planned propiska changes slammed by public, Eurasianet, 19 March 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-planned-propiska-changes-slammed-by-public (last accessed 26 August 2024).
[91] S.a., Your travel abroad is not appropriate, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/droi_20100602_6psuz_/droi_20100602_6psuz_en.pdf.
[92] S.a., Your travel abroad is not appropriate, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/droi_20100602_6psuz_/droi_20100602_6psuz_en.pdf.
[93] See for example, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/uzbekistan/#:~:text=There%20were%20no%20significant%20changes,in%20Uzbekistan%20during%20the%20year.&text=Although%20the%20government%20took%20some,human%20rights%20abuses%20to%20continue (last accessed August 2024); See also Catherine Putz, Karakalpak activist deprived of Kazakh citizenship, The Diplomat, 8 December 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/karakalpak-activist-deprived-of-kazakh-citizenship/ (last accessed: 26 August 2024).
[94] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Law on creating a system for issuing and issuing a biometric passport of a citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan abroad and on additional measures to modernize the biometric passport system of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://lex.uz/docs/4162591#6075445 (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[95] Karakalpak Youtube blogger Mustafa Tursynbaev arrested, Freedom for Eurasia, May 15, 2024 https://freedomforeurasia.org/karakalpak-youtube-blogger-mustafa-tursynbaev-arrested/ (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[96] See for example the conviction by the Uzbek Supreme Court of two officers for tortures committed during the investigations into the July 2022 Karakalpakstan protests, S.a., 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan“, Uzbekistan – United States Department of State.
[97] S.a., Freedom in the World 2024 – Uzbekistan, ecoi.net:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html
[98] S.a., Freedom in the World 2024 – Uzbekistan, ecoi.net:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2109072.html
[99] S.a., 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan“, Uzbekistan – United States Department of State.
[100] Ibid.; See also 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Uzbekistan, US Department of State, available on 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Uzbekistan | Refworld (last accessed: 30 August 2024).
[101] Ibid., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Uzbekistan.
[102] S.a., Karakalpak victims of transnational repressions. Who are they? https://freedomforeurasia.org/karakalpak-victims-of-transnational-repressions-who-are-they/.
[103] Ibid. (Karakalpak victims of transnational repressions. Who are they?)
[104] Search results Tajimuratov, Freedom for Eurasia, https://freedomforeurasia.org/?s=tajimuratov (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[105] Search results Reimov, Freedom for Eurasia, https://freedomforeurasia.org/?s=reimov (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[106] Search results Dadabaev, Freedom for Eurasia, https://freedomforeurasia.org/?s=dadebaev (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[107] S.a., 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan.
[108] Uzbekistan, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/uzbekistan/.
[109] Mihra Rittmann, Uzbekistan Should Investigate Claims of Ill-Treatment, Torture, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/uzbekistan-should-investigate-claims-ill-treatment-torture#:~:text=Last%20week%2C%20Uzbek%20blogger%20Abduqodir,leg%20with%20a%20special%20baton%20%E2%80%A6 (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[110] Uzbekistan, Toture Remains a Major Issue, Cabar, April 23, 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-torture-remains-a-major-issue (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[111] Ibid.
[112] Assessment of prison conditions in Uzbekistan, Association Central Asia, December 14, 2023, https://acaro.uz/en/gulnoz-mamarasulova-assessment-of-prison-conditions-in-uzbekistan/ (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[113] One of World’s Longest-Imprisoned Journalists is Freed, Human Rights Watch, February 22, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/22/one-worlds-longest-imprisoned-journalists-freed (last accessed: October 1, 2024).
[114] Case History: Azam Farmonov, Frontline Defenders, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/case-history-azam-farmonov (last accessed October 1, 2024).
[115] Bruce Pannier, Central Asia in Focus: Is a Karakalpak Leader Being Tortured in Prison?, RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, July 30, 2024, https://about.rferl.org/article/central-asia-in-focus-is-a-karakalpak-leader-being-tortured-in-prison/ (last accessed October 02, 2024).
[116] Uzbekistan: Sentencing of Mr. Sanjar Umarov, OMCT SOS-Torture Network, April 28, 2006, https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/uzbekistan-sentencing-of-mr-sanjar-umarov (last accessed October 02, 2024).
[117] Uzbekistan’s religious and Political Prisoners, United States Commission on international religious Freedom, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/2021%20Uzbekistan%20Report_0.pdf (last accessed October 02, 2024).
